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DAVID E. ROSS II; DIANE ROSS
WORTHEN; BETSY ROSS RAPPS; CONNIE
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Re:

Leontine C. Pond, et al. vs.
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance
Co., et al.
Appeal No. 920759-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
I represent the appellees in the above-entitled appeal
On their behalf, I am submitting this letter to you, with seven
copies, pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure (Citation of Supplemental Authorities).
The recent written opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals
in Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company vs. David E. Ross,
11i Appeal No. 910746-CA, filed March 10, 1993 (attached), is
pertinent to the argument made at pp. 29-33 of Appellee's Brief
filed on February 24, 1993.
Sincerely,

PBB:csw
cc:

Lynn P. Heward, Esq.
Delwin T. Pond, Esq.

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Utah Court of Appeals

MAR 1 0 1993

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Equitable Life & Casualty
Insurance Co., a Utah
corporation,

/•
'

MaryT.Noonan

Clerk of
of the
thArvv,*
Clerk
Court

OPINION

(For P u b l i c a t i o n )

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No.

v.

910746-CA

F I L E D
(March 1 0 , 1993)

David E. Ross II,
Defendant and Appellant,

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys:

Mark A. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Warren Patten, P. Bruce Badger, and Bruce D.
Reemsnyder, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Russon.
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's orders awarding
summary judgment and attorney fees to Equitable Life & Casualty
Insurance Co. (Equitable). We affirm.
FACTS
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we review
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798,
799 (Utah 1992).
In 1986, Bennett Leasing Company (Bennett) attempted a
hostile takeover of Equitable by attempting to purchase the stock
of David E. Ross II, his wife Connie Ross, his sister Betsy Ross
Rapps, and his uncle Galen Ross (collectively, the selling
group). R. Earl Ross, Equitable's chief executive officer, and
E. Roderick Ross, Equitable's president, opposed the attempted
purchase by Bennett. The dispute was resolved when the selling

group agreed to sell their stock to Equitable in exchange for
cash and Equitable preferred stock convertible to cash.
After considerable negotiation over several months,
Equitable sent an offer to the selling group by letter dated
September 25, 1987. That offer provided for an increase in the
purchase price of the stock and added:
This increase in purchase price is being made
hand in hand with the acceptance of the
agreement as enclosed. Any changes made with
the agreement will result in the decrease of
the proposed purchase price. In other words,
a premium is being paid to eliminate argument
over the minute terms of the agreement.
The selling group did not accept the agreement as enclosed, but
instead prepared, signed, and sent its own offer to Equitable on
October 30, 1987. Equitable signed the agreement on November 4,
and sent it back to the selling group, with a letter clarifying a
few points, which letter was approved by the selling group. The
final contract documents consisted of the agreement, an addendum,
an escrow agreement, and the letter of clarification.
However, at closing on December 2, 1987, David E. Ross II
asserted that an agreement for him to perform consulting services
for Equitable, which had been included in earlier drafts of the
agreement, should have been included in the final contract
documents, but was not. Equitable responded that no such
agreement was to be included, to which Ross replied that without
same there would be no contract. An impasse was avoided when the
parties agreed to "close around the issue" of the consulting
agreement, and both Ross and Equitable added handwritten
statements to the agreement. Ross wrote:
[B]y signing this instrument I do not waive
any right or claim to pursue the Consulting
Agreement pursuant to the agreement between
the parties. Not given for any acceptance of
any funds. In addition, acceptance of any
funds pursuant to the agreement shall not be
construed as a waiver of any kind.
Equitable added:
By following this directive, Equitable Life
and Casualty Insurance Company does not admit
or imply that there exists any "Consulting
Agreement" or understanding regarding any
consulting agreement. In addition, Equitable

Life and Casualty Insurance Company takes the
position that receipt of funds and
participation herein by David E. Ross is a
waiver of rights, if any exist, by David E.
Ross. Acceptance of the cash down payment by
Daniel Jackson, esquire trustee account, is
not a waiver of rights by David E. Ross.
The stock certificates were subsequently delivered to Equitable.
However, when the time came for David E. Ross II to endorse
the stock certificates, he refused to do so, claiming a right to
rescind the agreement. In response, Equitable filed a complaint
for specific performance of the agreement. Ross counterclaimed
for rescission of the agreement, alleging mutual and unilateral
mistake and seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud.
Equitable filed a motion for partial summary judgment enforcing
the agreement and thereby dismissing Ross's counterclaim for
rescission, which motion was granted.
The matter then proceeded to trial to the bench on David E.
Ross II's remaining claim of damages against Equitable for breach
of contract. Following Ross's opening statement, Equitable moved
for dismissal of the case. The Court, treating the motion as a
motion for summary judgment, considered the depositions and
exhibits marked by the parties for trial, and granted Equitable's
motion. Equitable subsequently requested and received attorney
fees and costs.
David E. Ross II appeals, raising the following issues:
(1) Were there sufficient material facts to establish his right
to rescission under a theory of unilateral mistake, and if so,
did he relinquish that right?; (2) Were there sufficient material
facts to establish a breach of contract action, entitling him to
either rescission or damages?; and (3) Were attorney fees
properly awarded to Equitable under the contract and, if so, were
such fees reasonable?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is only proper "when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Baldwin v. Burton, No. 900339,
slip op. at 4 (Utah February 19, 1993) (footnote omitted); see
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On an appeal from a summary judgment, we
construe the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Thurston v. Box
Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).

"We review the district court's legal conclusions for
correctness.11 Id. (citation omitted).
UNILATERAL MISTAKE
David E. Ross II argues that the trial court erred in
granting Equitable's pre-trial motion for summary judgment
because there were sufficient material facts to establish his
right to rescission under a theory of unilateral mistake.
Equitable responds that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment because Ross cannot establish his right to rescission on
the basis of unilateral mistake under any set of facts. We
agree.
In Klas v. Van Wagoner. 829 P.2d 135 (Utah App. 1992), we
outlined the four criteria that must be satisfied before
rescission based on unilateral mistake will be granted:
1. The mistake must be of so grave a
consequence that to enforce the contract as
actually made would be unconscionable.
2. The matter as to which the mistake was
made must relate to a material feature of the
contract.
3. Generally the mistake must have occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake.
4. It must be possible to give relief by way
of rescission without serious prejudice to
the other party except the loss of his
bargain. In other words, it must be possible
to put him in status quo.
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah
App. 1990), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1991)).
As to the first criterion, there are two kinds of
unconscionability: procedural and substantive. Id. at 139.
Procedural unconscionability centers on the "relative positions
of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the contract," Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah App. 1988)
(quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 461 (Utah
1983)), and occurs "where there is an absence of meaningful
choice and where lack of education or sophistication results in
no opportunity to understand the terms of the agreement." Id.
(citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock

Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985)). "Substantive
unconscionability occurs when contract terms are x so lopsided as
to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party,' or where
there is xan overall imbalance in rights and responsibilities
imposed by the contract, excessive price or a significant costprice disparity, or terms which are inconsistent with accepted
mores of commercial practice, /M Klas. 829 P.2d at 139 (quoting
Jones, 761 P.2d at 40).
Applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, we are not
convinced that the alleged mistake was so grave as to make
enforcement of the contract unconscionable. First, as to
procedural unconscionability, there is no indication in the facts
that the relative positions of the parties resulted in unequal
bargaining positions. To the contrary, the facts show that the
parties continually negotiated from equal positions. Nor do the
facts indicate that there was an absence of meaningful choice on
David E. ftoss II's behalf, or that he suffered any lack of
education or sophistication that resulted in an inability to
understand the terms of the agreement. Instead,, the facts show
that the parties engaged in many highly sophisticated
negotiations, in which numerous substantive changes were made to
the agreement. Thus, there was no procedural unconscionability.
Nor was there substantive unconscionability.
courts have consistently held that:

Utah appellate

sellers and buyers should be able to contract
on their own terms without the indulgence of
paternalism by the courts in the alleviation
of one side or another from the effects of a
poor bargain. They should be permitted to
enter into contracts that may actually be
unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on
one side.
Park Valley Corp. v. Baqlev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981)
(citation omitted); accord Klas, 829 P.2d at 139-40. This is
especially true when the parties are dealing at arms length.
Park Valley Corp.. 635 P.2d at 67.
In the case at bar, extensive negotiations took place in
which numerous items were added to and deleted from the
agreement. Given the parties' equal bargaining positions, it is
clear that the contract terms were not so lopsided as to unfairly
oppress or surprise Ross, nor was there was an overall imbalance
in rights and responsibilities imposed by the contract. We
therefore conclude that enforcement of the contract in this case
is not unconscionable.

Additionally, as to the third criterion, David E. Ross II
has not shown that the mistake occurred notwithstanding the
exercise of ordinary diligence by him. On October 30, 1987, the
selling group, of which Ross was a member, prepared, signed, and
sent a contract to Equitable. Equitable then signed the contract
and sent it back to the selling group, along with a letter
clarifying a few points. It was up to Ross at that point to
exercise ordinary diligence in examining the agreement prior to
the selling group's acceptance. However, he did not raise the
issue of the consulting agreement at that time, but waited until
closing on December 2, 1987, at which time he agreed to "close
around the issue" of the consulting agreement. Thus, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ross, if
there was any mistake on the part of Ross, it was entirely due to
his own negligence in not discovering and correcting what he
regarded to be an error in the parties' agreement. Under such
circumstances, we cannot say that "the mistake must have occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake." Klas, 829 P.2d at 138-39 (quoting Grahn,
800 P.2d at 327); see generally John Call Engineering, Inc. v.
Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987) (party seeking
rescission on the basis of unilateral mistake must establish that
error occurred despite that party's exercise of due care); Davis
v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834, 835 (1970) (party is
not entitled to rescission if mistake occurred as a result of
that party's own negligence).
Accordingly, because David E. Ross II did not fulfill two of
the four criteria necessary to justify rescission on the basis of
unilateral mistake, the trial court did not err in granting
Equitable's pre-trial motion for summary judgment on that claim.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's order granting
Equitable's second motion for summary judgment, alleging that the
agreement between the parties was ambiguous and that sufficient
material facts existed to establish a breach of contract action,
entitling him to either rescission or damages. Equitable
responds that the contract was unambiguous and did not provide
for a consulting agreement for Ross. Thus, Equitable argues, the
trial court properly granted its motion.
"Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort
to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions
we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of
correctness." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, whether a
contract is ambiguous is itself a question of law. Village Inn

Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co,. 790 P.2d 581, 582
(Utah App. 1990) (citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983); Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d
976, 977 (Utah App. 1989)). "Contract language may be ambiguous
if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express
the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or
more plausible meanings." Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
However, a contract term is not ambiguous simply because one
party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own
interests. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316,
1319 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted), cert, denied. 827 P.2d
47 6 (Utah 1992). Moreover, if we determine that the contract
terms are clear and unambiguous, "we interpret them according to
their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol evidence
is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the
parties." Id. (citing Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293; Valley Bank &
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah
App. 1989J) .
As an initial matter, we address David E. Ross II's argument
that the selling group accepted Equitable's September 25, 1987
offer, and that since that offer contained a provision that a
consulting fee of $200,000 to be paid to David E. Ross II for
being Equitable's legal advisor for five years, such provision
should be read into the agreement between the parties. Even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ross, such an
argument is untenable.
Although Equitable's September 25 offer did provide for a
consulting fee to be paid to Ross, that offer also provided that
the agreement must either be accepted as a whole or rejected:
This increase in purchase price is being made
hand in hand with the acceptance of the
agreement as enclosed. Any changes made with
the agreement will result in the decrease of
the proposed purchase price. In other words,
a premium is being paid to eliminate argument
over the minute terms of the agreement.
When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner.
Otherwise mutual assent is lacking, and no contract is formed.
Crane v. Timberbrook Village. Ltd.. 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah App.
1989); see generally Burton v. Coombs. 557 P.2d 148, 148-49 (Utah
1976). Thus, the selling group's October 30, 1987 offer, which

changed numerous provisions of Equitable's September 25 offer,1
must be viewed as a rejection of and counter-offer to Equitable's
September 25 offer. Accordingly, the selling groups October 30
offer and the addendum, escrow agreement, and Equitable's
November 4, 1987 letter of clarification constitute the agreement
in question in this case, and we examine those documents for
ambiguity.
In doing so, we conclude that the agreement between the
parties is clear and unambiguous. Although some of the extrinsic
evidence presented to the trial court indicates that earlier
drafts of the contract included a provision for a consulting
agreement for David E. Ross II, resort to that extrinsic evidence
is not required in this case, since such provision is simply not
included in the final draft. The final contract, which was
drafted by the selling group, makes no reference to a consulting
agreement, and this was the offer which was accepted by Equitable
on November 4, 1987, and eventually became the agreement between
the parties. Given the fact that the selling group, of which
David E. Ross II was a member, drafted this offer, which did not
include a consulting agreement, it would be grossly inequitable
at this point for this court to now go back and insert a
consulting agreement into the parties' agreement. Accordingly,
we decline to do so.
Furthermore, the only reference to a consulting agreement
whatsoever is contained in the addendum to the agreement, and
this reference plainly fails to establish the existence of such
an agreement. That provision simply provides, in pertinent part:
2. Offset. The redemption, or purchase
price of the Equitable Preferred Stock owned
or attributed to the Selling Group and
redeemed or purchased by Equitable shall be
offset and decreased by the amount of federal
taxes, interest and penalties, incurred and
paid by Equitable as a result of an audit or
audits in which Equitable's income tax
obligation is increased from adjustments made
as a result of the deduction as an ordinary
and reasonable expense of any of the
1. These changes included an increase in the down payment to the
selling group, a decrease in the preferred Equitable stock, the
addition of a payment of $100,000 to David E. Ross II at closing,
an adjustment in the price at which the selling group could
redeem their preferred Equitable shares, and an increase in the
deferred payment to the selling group, as well as several other
changes.

following being partially or totally
disallowed;
(a)

Consulting payments to David;

(b) Payment of $300,000 to Bennett
Leasing Company;
(c) Settlement of lawsuits with
David E. Ross II;
(d) Payment of $250,000 to First
National Bank of New Jersey.
This provision does not establish the existence of a
consulting agreement, nor of any of the other provisions listed,
but only indicates that if payments are made, the total payment
should be* offset by the payment of taxes, interest and penalties
incurred and paid by Equitable if those fees are paid, deducted
for tax purposes, and then disallowed as tax deductions.2
Nor does the fact that David E. Ross II added the following
handwritten language to the addendum to the contract alter our
analysis:
[B]y signing this instrument I do not waive
any right or claim to pursue the Consulting
Agreement pursuant to the agreement between
the parties. Not given for any acceptance of
any funds. In addition, acceptance of any
funds pursuant to the agreement shall not be
construed as a waiver of any kind.
2. Moreover, even were we to find the addendum establishes the
existence of a consulting agreement, Ross's claim nevertheless
fails. The only mention of a consulting agreement in any of the
documents which constitute-the parties' agreement is this passing
reference in the addendum. There is no specification in any of
the documents of the scope, the terms, or the value of the
consulting agreement. Thus, even if inclusion of such agreement
was at one time considered by the parties, clearly there was no
"meeting of the minds" as to that issue, as the trial court
correctly found to be the case here. Since there was no "meeting
of the minds" as to the consulting agreement, it cannot be
considered part of the parties' agreement. See Cottonwood Mall
Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); John Call
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah
1987); Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 584
(Utah App. 1992).

All this provision indicates is that Ross retained his right to
pursue the consulting agreement that was included in earlier
drafts of the contract between the parties. There is no
reservation, explicit or implicit, of a right to rescind the
agreement entered into, only to pursue a separate right to a
consulting agreement.3 However, it is far too great a leap to
read the language in guestion as indicating that by reserving a
right to pursue a consulting agreement, Ross also reserved a
right to totally rescind the agreement between the parties. We
therefore decline to do so.
Since the agreement between Equitable and the selling group
unambiguously did not provide for a consulting agreement, the
trial court did not err in granting Equitable's second motion for
summary judgment on David E. Ross's remaining claim of damages.4
ATTORNEY FEES
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's award of attorney
fees to Equitable, claiming that although Equitable is entitled
to an award of attorney fees with regard to its claim for breach
of contract, it is not entitled to those fees incurred in
defending against Ross's claim for rescission. Equitable
responds that since the contract between the parties provided for
such fees, and since the two issues are, in essence, the same
issue, the trial court properly awarded it attorney fees.
In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by
statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988); accord Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266, 269 (Utah 1992). If provided for by contract, attorney fees
are awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract. Dixie
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988. Although such an award is a matter
of legal right, it must be reasonable and supported by adequate
3. Additionally, we note that our decision in this matter in no
way forecloses Ross's right to pursue that claim.
4. Moreover, even were we to find that the agreement between the
parties was ambiguous, we would nonetheless have to rule against
Ross, given the well-settled rule that ambiguous contracts must
be construed against the drafter. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma,
655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) ("The well-established rule in
Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a
contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the
agreement.M); Parks Enters., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc.,
652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also settled law that a
contract will be construed against the drafter.").

evidence, Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990).
Determination of such fees is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and will not be overturned unless there is a showing
of a clear abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at
989, Furthermore, we "will presume that the discretion of the
trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly
shows to the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. General Oil
Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)).
In the case at bar, the parties' contract provides:
In the event any party hereto alleges a
breach or violation of the terms and
conditions of this Agreement by another
party, the prevailing party to such resulting
action shall have a right to recover from the
'non-prevailing party any and all costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, incurred in the defense or pursuit of
said action.
The plain language of the contract provides that the
prevailing party has a right to an award of attorney fees
incurred in the pursuit or defense of an action arising from a
claimed violation of the contract. Since Equitable incurred fees
both in pursuing its claim for breach of contract and in
defending against David E. Ross II's claim for rescission, it is
clearly entitled to an award of attorney fees in regard to both
actions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney fees in accordance with the terms of the
parties' contract.
Ross also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in determining that Equitable's requested attorney fees were
reasonable. As to the reasonableness of the attorney fees
awarded by the trial court, determination of such fees is within
the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the fees are
supported by the evidence in the record. Baldwin v. Burton, No.
900339, slip op. at 17 (Utah February 19, 1993) (footnotes
omitted). Among the factors to be considered by the trial court
in considering the reasonableness of the fee are "the extent of
services rendered, the difficulty of the issues involved, the
reasonableness of time spent on the case, fees charged in the
locality for similar services, and the necessity of bringing an
action to vindicate rights." Id. at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
In the case at bar, the trial court's determination is amply
supported by the evidence and appears to be reasonable,
especially in light of the fact that Equitable filed an attorney

fees affidavit with detailed billing statements attached, which
strictly complied with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. Since the record supports the trial court's
award of attorney fees in this case, we cannot say that the trial
court committed a clear abuse of discretion in determining that
the said fees were reasonable.5
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in granting Equitable's motions for summary
judgment, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Equitable
attorney fees under the contract. Accordingly, we affirm.

Leonard H. Russon,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

&4$UL M, H^cJL
Regnal W. Garff, Judge

5. This is particularly true considering the fact that the basis
of Ross's opposition to the reasonableness of the award of
attorney fees, that Equitable should have filed another motion
for summary judgment as to Ross's remaining claims instead of
going to trial, is, as noted by the trial court, a somewhat
disingenuous position for a party bringing a claim in good faith
to take.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

JURISDICTION

1

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

A.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

1

B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

2

1.

First Summary Judgment Motion

2

2.

Second Summary Judgment Motion

3

C.
III.

IV.

MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND JOIN ADDITIONAL
PLAINTIFFS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A.

MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS

4

B.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

B.
C.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS DENIED BECAUSE IT
WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE NUMEROSITY AND TYPICALITY
PRONGS WERE NOT MET

15

PLAINTIFFS' LIQUIDATION CLAIM WAS DENIED BECAUSE
IIC NEVER LIQUIDATED

15

THERE WERE SEVERAL GROUNDS TO SUPPORT A DISMISSAL
OF PLAINTIFFS' BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM . . .

16

1.
2.

3.

s:\pbb\2691

15

Plaintiffs' Claims Fail Because Thev Are Not
Eguitable Shareholders As They Suppose. . . .

16

The Purchase of the Selling Group's Stock Was
Based on the Business Judgment of Equitable's
Board and Did Not Give Rise to a Duty to
Purchase Plaintiffs' IIC Preferred Stock. . .

17

Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Direct Damage and
Therefore Have No Individual Cause of
Action

17

ii

4.
D.

Plaintiffs' Demand for Punitive Damages is
Not Permitted by Statute

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FUTILE
AND FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM

18
18

ARGUMENT

18

A.

18

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED
1.

The Requirements of Rule 23(a) Have Not Been
Met
a.

B.

C.

The Numerosity and Typicality
Requirements Were Not Met

19
20

JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS'
LIQUIDATION CLAIM

21

1.

No Liquidation of IIC Ever Occurred

22

2.

Plaintiffs' Reliance on the Tax Code is
Misplaced

24

JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING
CLAIMS
1.
2.

3.

4.

27

The Fact That Plaintiffs Are Not Equitable
Shareholders Is Fatal to Their Claim

28

The Law in Massachusetts That in Closely Held
Corporations the Corporation Must Ratably
Purchase Shares From Minority Shareholders is
Not the Law in Utah, The Purchase of the
Selling Group's Stock Was Based on the
Business Judgment of Equitable's Board and
Did Not Give Rise to a Duty to Purchase
Plaintiffs' IIC Preferred Stock

29

Plaintiffs Have No Claim for Relief Even if
There Were a Genuine Issue of Fact
Surrounding the Motive for the Purchase of
the Selling Group's Stock

32

The Law in Utah is That a Cause of Action For
Any Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Corporate
Officers Belongs to the Corporation and Not
to Stockholders Individually

34

iii

5•
D.

Punitive Damages Cannot be Awarded When No
General or Compensatory Damages Are Sought.

JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
AND TO ALLOW INTERVENTION OF ADDITIONAL PREFERRED
STOCKHOLDERS
1.

Plaintiffs' Claim of Alleged Oppressive
Conduct Failed to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief May Be Granted
a.
b.

.

35

38

39

Plaintiffs' Stock is 6% Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock

39

A Claim of Excessive Salaries is
Derivative and Belongs to the
Corporation

41

CONCLUSION

41

ADDENDUM

43

s:\pbb\2691

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Cases:
Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Company, 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992)

27

Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985)

37

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,
752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988)

27

Call v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986)
Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

2
....

4

College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith
Fork Irr. Co. , 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989)

27

Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983)

37

D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989)

2

Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983)

4

Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978)
Rice Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County,
646 P.2d 696, 698 n.3 (Utah 1982)
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636
(Utah 1980)
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomauist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989)

30, 36, 37

27
20, 34, 41

Themv v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1975) . . . .

3
2

United States Supreme Court and Circuit Court of Appeals Cases:
Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Company.
503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974)

20

Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264
(4th Cir. 1978)

30

s:\pbb\2691

v

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct.
2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974)

19

In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 1986)

30, 34

McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) . . .
30
Redhouse v. Quality Food Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230
(10th Cir. 1975)
19, 20
Rossin v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712
(10th Cir. 1973)

20

Schenker v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company,
329 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1964)

23

Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 524 F.2d 263
(10th Cir. 1975)

20

United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d 677, 679
(9th Cir. 1942)

23

United States District Court Cases;
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins
Bank & Trust, 558 F.Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Utah 1983)

38

Burt v. Blue Shield of Southwest Idaho, 591 F.Supp.
755 (S.D. Ohio 1984)

38

De Robert v. Gannett Corp., Inc., 551 F.Supp. 973
(D. Hawaii 1982)

38

Emory v. United States, 374 F.Supp. 1051, 1055
(E.D. Tenn. 1972)

23

Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988)

. . . .

White v. Gates Rubber Company, 53 F.R.D. 412
(D. Colo. 1971)

30
21

Other State Court Cases;
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 P.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984) . . . .

32

Bessett, et al. v. Bessett, 434 N.E.2d 208 (Mass. 1982) . . .

41

Brown v. Tennev, 532 N.E.2d 230 (111. 1988)
vi

28, 29

Cheff v. Mathes, 199 P.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)
Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)
Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. App.
1990)

31
....

38

31, 34, 35

Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,
Inc. , 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)

29, 30, 40

Ex parte Amos, 114 So. 760, 765 (Fla. 1927)
Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. 1969)
In re Brock 7 s Estate, 218 A.2d 281, 289 (Pa. 1966)
Rothschild International Corporation v. Liggett
Group Inc., 463 A.2d 642, 646 (Ct. Ch. Del. 1983) . . . .
State ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding &
Casualty Co. , 281 N.W. 172, 175 (Iowa 1938)
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. Supr. 1985)

24
...

35
24

23, 24
24
32

Other Authorities:
3B Moored Federal Practice, H 23.02-2 (2nd Ed.)

20

6A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations, § 2821 (perm. ed. 1989)

16, 29

12B W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations, § 5767 (perm. ed. 1984)

16, 29

Bittker and Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders, 1 9.52 (1971)

25

Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7698 (1979)

24

Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-92 (a)

39

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-64D

40

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1) (a)

36

s:\pbb\2691

vii

Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-41

40

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

viii

19, 20
27

I.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
At the trial court level Judge Sawaya entered five

rulings against plaintiffs.1

Although plaintiffs' Notice of

Appeal states that they intend to appeal each of these rulings,
their statement of the issues, standard of review, and argument
do not fairly focus on the nature of each trial court ruling.

A.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
In the trial court's first ruling against the

plaintiffs, Judge Sawaya denied plaintiffs' request to certify
this case as a class action.
request without oral argument.

Judge Sawaya first denied the
Order, R. 084.

Plaintiffs

renewed their Motion and requested an opportunity to more fully
brief the case law.

Motion, R. 142.

Judge Sawaya granted the

request and allowed plaintiffs to file an exhaustive Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, R. 103, and to make oral argument.

1

He

Plaintiffs/Appellants will be referred to throughout
this brief as plaintiffs. Defendants/Appellees will be referred
to throughout as defendants. The term "defendants" refers
collectively, unless otherwise designated, to Equitable Life and
Casualty Insurance Company, Insurance Investment Company, R. Earl
Ross, and E. Roderick Ross.
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then denied class action certification a second time.

Order,

R. 218.
Judge Sawaya's decision on class action status can only
be reversed when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the
law or abused its discretion.

Call v. City of West Jordan, 727

P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).

B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
1.

First Summary Judgment Motion

In the trial court's second ruling against plaintiffs,
Judge Sawaya granted defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment on plaintiffs' claim that a partial liquidation of
Insurance Investment Company ("IIC") had occurred which would
entitle plaintiffs as IIC preferred shareholders to distribution
rights under the corporation's Articles of Incorporation.

Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 269; Minute Entry giving reason
for granting Motion, R. 310; Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment, R. 317.
In reviewing this award of partial summary judgment,
this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs to determine whether there is a genuine dispute as
to any material fact, or whether, even according to the facts as
plaintiffs contend, defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989)

(quoting Themv v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1975).
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In considering whether there is a genuine dispute as to
any material fact, this Court should be aware that virtually
every material fact laid out by defendants in their two Motions
for Summary Judgment went unchallenged and undisputed.
Plaintiffs now attempt, in their brief to this court, to frame
issues that by their nature dispute formerly unchallenged facts.
Thus, plaintiffs do not properly focus on the proper standard of
appellate review of summary judgments.
In deciding whether the trial court properly granted
summary judgment as a matter of law, this Court must give no
deference to the trial court's view of the law, but should review
it for correctness.

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.

Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
2.

Second Summary Judgment Motion

In the trial court's third ruling against plaintiffs,
Judge Sawaya granted defendants' second Motion for Summary
Judgment that disposed of plaintiffs' remaining claim for breach
of fiduciary duty.

Summary Judgment Motion, R. 3 90; Order and

Summary Judgment, R. 596.

Once again, the facts were undisputed.

See Defendants Reply Memorandum, R. 557 at 2.

The standard of

review is the same as for all summary judgment motions.

C.

MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND JOIN ADDITIONAL
PLAINTIFFS
In the fourth and fifth rulings against plaintiffs, the

trial court denied plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Amended Complaint,

s \pbb\2691
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R. 525, and plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene.

R. 493.

Plaintiffs

filed these motions in an apparent response to defendants' second
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendants did not oppose the

Motion to Intervene; however, Judge Sawaya denied both the
motions to amend and to intervene several weeks after he had
granted defendants' second summary judgment motion.
603, Order, R. 608.

Order, R.

Judge Sawaya's decision to deny plaintiffs'

motions to amend and to intervene were matters that were within
the broad discretion of the court and should not be disturbedabsent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice.

Chadwick

v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983)).

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following material facts were presented in support

of defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.

It must again be

noted that, although plaintiffs had the benefit of the deposition
testimony of E. Roderick Ross and R. Earl Ross prior to
defendants filing the second motion for summary judgment,
plaintiffs never presented contradictory evidence nor disputed in
any other way the following facts as set forth by defendants.2

2

Plaintiffs never filed counter affidavits. Although
they took the depositions of Earl and Rod Ross prior to the
second summary judgment motion, plaintiffs were not able to
controvert any of defendants' facts. Plaintiffs' failure to
(continued...)
-4-

1.

Insurance Investment Company ("IIC") is a Utah

corporation in good standing.

Pond Complaint f 2 (R. 002); Hyer

Complaint in Intervention % 2 (R. 158); Answer % 2 (R. 033);
Affidavit of Earl Ross (hereinafter "Ross Aff.") H 2 (R. 474).
2.

Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company

("Equitable") is a Utah corporation in good standing and a Utah
domestic insurance company.

Pond Complaint % 2; Hyer Complaint

in Intervention; Answer % 2; Ross Aff. % 3.
3.

IIC is a holding company which owns a majority of

the outstanding Equitable common stock.
4.

Ross Aff. % 4.

The remaining approximately 2 0 percent of

outstanding Equitable common stock is owned by the public and
defendants R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross, R. Earl Ross's four
sisters and mother and a trust for the primary benefit of R. Earl
Ross's mother (the "Ross Family").
5.

Icl. f 5.

IIC has two classes of stock, namely voting common

that is owned by members of the Ross Family, a family charitable
foundation and Equitable, and non-voting preferred stock of which
approximately 70 percent is owned by the Ross Family and
Equitable and 30 percent is owned by plaintiffs and others.

The

preferred stock is non-voting and has an annual non-cumulative
dividend right of $.06 per share.

2

Id. % 6.

(...continued)
controvert defendants' statement of undisputed facts as required
by Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration was pointed
out to the trial court in defendants' Reply Memorandum of Points
and Authorities. See R. 557 at 2.
s:\pbb\2691
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6.

Plaintiff Leontine Pond owns 500 shares of IIC

preferred stock.

She does not now, nor did she in 1987, own any

Equitable stock or IIC common stock.

Complaint % 7, 32; Answer

1 7; Ross Aff. H 7.
7.

Plaintiff Merle Hyer Company owns 1175 shares of

IIC preferred stock.

It did not in 1987, nor does it today, own

any Equitable stock or IIC common stock.

Hyer Complaint in

Intervention, % 7; Answer to Hyer Complaint in Intervention U 7
(R. 204); Ross Aff. % 8.
8.

In October of 1986, Bennett Leasing Company, as

part of a hostile takeover attempt, entered into agreements with
David E. Ross II, Galen Ross, and Betsy Ross Rapps (collectively
the "Selling Group") to purchase their rights in IIC and the Ross
Family foundation.

If all such rights were acquired and control

of the foundation obtained, Bennett Leasing may have acquired
control of IIC and hence, control of Equitable.
9.

Ross Aff. % 9.

Bennett Leasing failed to obtain approval of the

Utah Department of Insurance as required by the Utah Insurance
Code before staging its takeover attempt.
10.

Id. U 10.

Bennett Leasing's hostile takeover eventually

failed in the summer of 1987, when Equitable purchased all of
Bennett Leasing's interest.

This purchase was made after the

Department of Insurance refused to grant Bennett Leasing the
certification required by the Insurance Code.

-6-

Icl. % 11.

11.

As a direct consequence of the Selling Group's

attempted sale to Bennett Leasing, nine lawsuits were filed in
1986 and 1987, in the Third District Court, involving Bennett
Leasing, IIC, Equitable, the Ross Family, and the Selling Group.
Id. H 12.
12.

The prospects of a hostile takeover and change in

management directly contributed to a loss of Equitable's
business.

From 1986 to 1987, during the Bennett Leasing takeover

attempt, Equitable's total premiums dropped 2.6%.

From 1987 to

1988, after the situation had stabilized, the total premiums rose
19.4 percent.
13.

Id. 1 13.
Throughout the Bennett Leasing controversy and

again in August 1987, Equitable negotiated with the Selling Group
to purchase their Equitable stock.

Equitable desired to purchase

the Selling Group's stock in order to stabilize Equitable, bring
an end to mounting litigation, and prevent the prospect of a sale
by the Selling Group to another corporate raider.

The Utah

Department of Insurance encouraged and urged Equitable to
purchase the Selling Group's stock.
14.

Id. % 14.

On or about October 30, 1987, Equitable, under the

direction of its Board of Directors, entered into an agreement to
purchase 11,802.23 shares of IIC common stock from the Selling
Group.

Because the Selling Group would not sell this controlling

stock unless Equitable purchased all of their stock in all
family-related corporations, Equitable also purchased 44,544.37
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shares of Equitable common stock, 25,050.66 shares of IIC common
stock, 25,050.66 shares of IIC preferred stock, and 9,793.10
shares of National Housing Finance Syndicate (a family owned real
estate investment company).
15.

Id.

IIC was not a party to the Stock Purchase

Agreement and played no part in Equitable's decision to purchase
the stock.

B.

Id. 1 15.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
Both IIC and Equitable are separate and distinct Utah

corporations, each with its principal place of business located
in Salt Lake City.

IIC is a stock holding company that owned

less than 80 percent of Equitable common stock before the 1987
purchase, but more than 80 percent of Equitable common stock
after the 1987 purchase.

Equitable in turn is engaged in the

development and marketing of life and health insurance products.
Equitable was founded in 1935 as Equitable Mutual Aid Protective
Society by Dr. Roderick Earl Ross, the grandfather of the Ross
Family.
stock.

The Ross Family owns or controls all of the IIC's voting
Although some of the Ross Family serve on both

Equitable7s and IIC's Board of Directors, the two boards are not
identical.
In October 1986, defendants Rod and Earl Ross, the
primary officers of Equitable, became aware that Rod's brother,
David Ross, his sister, Betsy Ross Rapps, and their uncle, Galen

r, . \^KK\

OCQ1

"" O

~

Ross (the "Selling Group"), were secretly attempting to sell the
control of Equitable to Bennett Leasing Company.

At that time,

David was the only member of the Selling Group who had any
involvement in the management of Equitable.

He was on

Equitable's board and also served as corporate counsel.

The

Selling Group represented to Bennett Leasing that their stock,
together with their control of a family charitable foundation,
would give Bennett Leasing control of IIC and Equitable.
Bennett Leasing failed to comply with the mandatorystatutory requirements for taking over an insurance company, in
that it failed to obtain approval for the takeover from the Utah
Department of Insurance.

This approval was necessary for the

protection of Equitable's policy holders and public shareholders.
As soon as Equitable discovered Bennett Leasing's hostile
takeover attempt, Equitable moved under the insurance code to
prevent the takeover, based on Bennett Leasing's failure to
comply with the statutory requirements.

Shortly thereafter,

lawsuits were filed as the various factions in the Ross Family,
Bennett Leasing, and the Selling Group positioned themselves.
Galen Ross was the first to file a lawsuit in an attempt to gain
control of the voting rights of the family charitable foundation
that owned the controlling interest in IIC.

In December 1986,

Galen, David, and Betsy filed suit to enjoin the voting of
certain stock.
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Throughout the spring of 1987, Equitable continued to
pressure the Department of Insurance to deny Bennett Leasing the
right to stage a takeover.

The Utah Insurance Commissioner was

finally convinced that Bennett Leasing at that time lacked the
ability to successfully operate Equitable and Bennett Leasing7s
certification was not approved.

To prevent a reapplication by

Bennett Leasing and in an attempt to acquire the IIC common stock
of the Selling Group to prevent future hostile takeovers,
Equitable purchased Bennett Leasing's interests in the summer of
1987.

Equitable then attempted to exercise Bennett Leasing's

agreement with Galen but not David or Betsy.

This resulted in

another lawsuit by the Selling Group to prevent Equitable from
buying only Galen's stock.
By the end of 1987, nine lawsuits had been filed,
including a suit by Equitable against Bennett Leasing alleging
RICO violations and against David for breach of his fiduciary
duties as a director of Equitable.

At one hearing, there were no

fewer than 23 attorneys representing the different factions.
The insurance business greatly relies upon not only the
actual stability of the insurance company, but also the
appearance of stability.

The Selling Group's hostile takeover

attempts damaged Equitable's image of stability and hence its
business, particularly its relations with its selling agents.
Ultimately, in August 1987, in an effort to stabilize
Equitable and bring an end to the numerous lawsuits, Equitable

«?-\r»bb\2691
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began serious negotiations with the Selling Group to purchase the
Selling Group's IIC common stock.

Attorney Daniel Jackson

represented the Selling Group collectively in the negotiations.
Initially, Equitable was only interested in purchasing the IIC
common stock--the control stock--but the Selling Group refused to
deal unless Equitable also purchased all their IIC preferred
stock, their Equitable stock, and their stock in another family
corporation, National Housing and Finance Syndicate.
% 14, R. 474.

Ross Aff.

Throughout the negotiations with the Selling

Group, Equitable's various offers were each based upon a single
sum it was willing to pay for the Selling Group's entire
stockholdings in all three corporations.

The Selling Group then

determined, amongst themselves, how they would divide this sum.
However, during this time, the individual interests of the
Selling Group became so adverse that each member of the group was
advised to, and did in fact, retain separate legal counsel.
The negotiations between Equitable and the members of
the Selling Group continued over several months and culminated in
a Stock Purchase Agreement, dated October 30, 1987.

The Utah

Insurance Commissioner had repeatedly encouraged such a
settlement, and the Commissioner reviewed and formally approved
the final agreement.

As part of the agreement, all the parties

dismissed their lawsuits.

It is undeniably clear that the

negotiations between Equitable and the Selling Group were
conducted at arms length.

s:\pbb\2691
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characterized as "damn bloody".
R. 452.

See Affidavit of Daniel Jackson,

The distance and divisiveness among the parties did not

end when the Stock Purchase Agreement was finally closed in
December 1987.

In fact, at that point

David characteristically

contended that he was entitled to an additional consulting
contract with Equitable valued at $200,000 as further
consideration for his stock.

Equitable refused to enter into

this separate consulting agreement, resulting in yet another
lawsuit as David attempted to rescind.3
Plaintiffs' Claims.
Plaintiffs in the present lawsuit each own shares of
IIC preferred stock, but they do not own any shares of Equitable
stock or IIC common stock.4

They are disgruntled because

Equitable did not offer to buy their IIC preferred stock at the
time it purchased the Selling Group's stock.

Even though they

allege a breach of fiduciary duty by Equitable's board of
directors, they admit that Equitable "probably paid about the

3

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company v. David E.
Ross, II, Civil No. C-8804644, went to trial before Judge Moffat
on December 17, 1990. Judgment was entered in Equitable's favor.
The case is now on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
4

Although plaintiffs allege that their predecessors paid
for the IIC preferred stock years ago and that they have been
waiting ever since for a return on their investment, plaintiffs
never developed this claim during the trial court proceedings.
It is just as likely that the stock was issued to insurance
policyholders when the corporate structure switched from a mutual
insurance company to a stock company in the 1940s. This would
explain why plaintiffs' stock is non-voting with only a $.06
dividend right. See Transcript of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, 11/18/91, R. 740, 5:14-6:6, 15:11-25.
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right price" for the stock and that Equitable was advantaged
rather than harmed by purchasing the Selling Group's stock.

See

Plaintiffs' Statement of Answering Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-3, R. 87.

They also admit

that no harm came to Insurance Investment Company as a result of
the transaction.

Appellant's Brief at 41.

Plaintiffs' prolix Complaint is not divided into
separate claims for relief or causes of action.5

However, after

long examination, it appears plaintiffs' claims are divided into
two categories.

Plaintiffs' first claim is based on the theory

that IIC was partially liquidated when Equitable's assets were
used to purchase the Selling Group's stock.

A liquidation, if it

had occurred, would have entitled plaintiffs, as IIC preferred
shareholders, to share in the distribution of the assets of the
corporation.

Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on this claim

5

The first 22 or so paragraphs in the complaint allege
that class action status should be afforded these plaintiffs.
Mrs. Pond's motions for class action certification were denied
twice by Judge Sawaya.
Paragraphs 26-3 8 of the Complaint appear to allege
breach of fiduciary duties surrounding a tender offer Equitable
made to purchase its common stock at $22.50 a share. This tender
offer was independent of the purchase agreement with the Selling
Group. Plaintiffs later admitted, however, in Response to
Defendants' Requests for Admission that plaintiffs are not making
any claim against any defendant on the ground that they have been
damaged by the tender offer. Answers to Requests for Admissions
No. 47, R. 463.
Paragraphs 3 9-59 bounce back and forth between
plaintiffs' claim that IIC was liquidated and their claim that
defendants breached their fiduciary duties. The breach of
fiduciary claim appears to be made in paragraphs 53-56.
s:\pbb\2691
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asking that IIC be further liquidated and that their stock be
purchased, or exchanged for Equitable stock.

Complaint at 12, R.

- 013.
The trial court fully disposed of plaintiffs'
liquidation claim on October 24, 1990, when it granted
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered an
Order based on the undisputed fact that no liquidation of IIC, as
contemplated by the Articles of Incorporation, had occurred.

See

Minute Entry dated September 25, 1990, R. 310; Order dated
October 24, 1990, R. 317.
Plaintiff's second category of claims, alleged in only
four paragraphs in the Complaint, is based on a theory of breach
of fiduciary duties allegedly owed plaintiffs by certain
unspecified defendants in their capacities as directors and
majority shareholders.

The breach of fiduciary duty allegedly

occurred when the unspecified defendants excluded plaintiffs in
the distribution and liquidation of IIC assets, referred to in
the first claim.

Plaintiffs' complaint in this regard is vague;

for instance, it does not distinguish between claims made against
IIC and those made against Equitable's officers, directors, and
shareholders.

Complaint % 53-56, R. 002.

were also not pleaded alternatively.

Plaintiffs' claims

As for relief, plaintiffs'

demand for mandatory injunctive relief, based on an allegation
that they had no adequate remedy at law, related only to their
theory of a corporate liquidation.

-14-

The sole remaining demand for

relief was for punitive damages only, with no demand for general
and compensatory damages.

IV.

Jd. at 12.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS DENIED BECAUSE IT WAS
OBVIOUS THAT THE NUMEROSITY AND TYPICALITY PRONGS WERE
NOT MET
Judge Sawaya twice denied plaintiffs' motions for class

action certification.

It was plainly apparent that the

numerosity and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure were not met.

Despite plaintiffs'

written solicitation to all IIC preferred shareholders to join as
litigants in this action, only 10 additional shareholders
demonstrated any interest.

The numerosity requirement requires a

demonstration that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder
is impracticable.

The typicality requirement requires a

demonstration that there are other members of the preferred class
who have the same grievance as plaintiffs.

The limited interest

shown by the members of the proposed class demonstrates that the
requirements for class action certification were not met.

B.

PLAINTIFFS' LIQUIDATION CLAIM WAS DENIED BECAUSE IIC
NEVER LIQUIDATED
Judge Sawaya properly held that defendants were

entitled to summary judgment denying plaintiffs' liquidation
claim because the fact was undisputed that no liquidation of IIC,

s \pbb\2691
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as contemplated in its Articles of Incorporation, had ever
occurred.

C-

THERE WERE SEVERAL GROUNDS TO SUPPORT A DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
1.

Plaintiffs' Claims Fail Because They Are Not
Equitable Shareholders As They Suppose.

Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim relies on
the faulty premise that plaintiffs are Equitable minority
shareholders because they own stock in Equitable's holding
company, IIC.

Equitable and IIC have separate corporate

existences which are not altered because the Ross family is
involved with both corporations.

6A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of

the Law of Private Corporations, § 2821 (perm. ed. 1989) .
Stockholders in a holding company are not stockholders, nor
entitled to rights of stockholders in the subsidiary of the
holding company.

12B W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of

Private Corporations, § 5767 (perm. ed. 1984).
IIC had no involvement whatsoever in the stock
purchase.

The ability of Equitable to act independently of its

parent is not affected by the fact that some of the shareholders,
officers, and directors of IIC and Equitable are the same.

6A W_^

Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 2821
(perm ed. 1989).

-16-

2•

The Purchase of the Selling Groups Stock Was
Based on the Business Judgment of Eguitable's
Board and Did Not Give Rise to a Duty to Purchase
Plaintiffs/ IIC Preferred Stock.

Equitable's board, according to its best judgment,
elected to purchase the selling group's stock to (1) promote an
orderly transaction of Equitable's business that had been damaged
during the takeover bid; (2) eliminate divided loyalties among
the various shareholder factions and assure that the selling
group would not participate in another hostile takeover; and
(3) bring an end to numerous lawsuits that were pending in the
Third District Court.

Equitable is entitled to deal selectively

with its stockholders and was not required to purchase
plaintiffs' stock.

Any such decision is measured by the business

judgment rule.
3.

Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Direct Damage and
Therefore Have No Individual Cause of Action,

The fiduciary relationship of a director or officer of
a corporation to shareholders is well recognized; however, that
relationship is generally held to be between the directors and
shareholders as a whole.

Aside from the fact that IIC was not

involved, these IIC shareholders cannot in their own right and
for their own personal use and benefit, maintain an action for
the recovery of corporate funds.

s:\pbb\2691
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4.

Plaintiffs' Demand for Punitive Damages is Not
Permitted by Statute»

Plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages only, as to
their breach of fiduciary duty claim, is barred by Utah Code
Annotated § 78-18-1(1) (a) which forbids an award of punitive
damages unless general and compensatory damages are awarded.

D.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FUTILE AND
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
It was proper to deny plaintiffs' motions to amend the

Complaint and to join additional IIC preferred shareholders
because the amendment was futile and failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.

Plaintiffs' proposed claim of

oppressive corporate salaries stated a derivative claim belonging
to IIC and/or Equitable.

Their proposed claim concerning

corporate dividends ignored the nature of their 6 percent noncumulative, non-voting, preferred stock with a $1.00 par value.

V.

ARGUMENT
A.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED
Plaintiffs sought class action certification on the

basis that there were 105 IIC preferred shareholders similarly
situated.
It appeared to Judge Sawaya that this case was not
appropriate for class action status so he twice denied
plaintiffs' motion to certify.

<s-\nhb\26 91
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Judge Sawaya's observation proved
During

correct.

the c o u r s e of discovery,, p l a i n t i f f s were p r o v i d e d wi tl 1
:y

IIC's s

of the p r e f e r r e d
Se e

to be

letter

R.

shareholders

stockholders

576.

Only

Id

counsel w r o t e a letter to

trying to enlist
i H i t i m i,i i

IT1

to be

their

each

support.

preferred
included. 6

T h e R e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 23(a) H a v e N o t B e e n M e t .
'I if-

prerequisites
Jacquelin,

Plain',::.!.;

r e s p o n d e d w i t h any desire

I
;\

.

I'll

h

i

\.>

\ ) \ d l i l t , a J li<- J 'i

have b e e n s a t i s f i e d .

417 U . S .
R u l e 23 (a.)

1 r:b,

94 P,H:.

'.'111 y

It

( "'1! I

E i s e n v. C a r l i s l e
2 1 4 0 , 40 L.Ed.2d

&

731

-"^ ,

:i)f the Uta 1 i R u l e s of Civil P r o c e d u r e

states:

(a)
P r e r e q u i s i t e s to a c l a s s a c t i o n .
One or
m o r e m e m b e r s of a class m a y sue or be sued as
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t i e s on b e h a l f of all only
if (1) the c l a s s is so n u m e r o u s that j o i n d e r
of all m e m b e r s is i m p r a c t i c a b l e , (2) t h e r e
are q u e s t i o n s of law or fact common to the
c l a s s , (3) the c l a i m s or d e f e n s e s of the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t i e s are typical of the
c l a i m s or d e f e n s e s of the c l a s s , and (4) the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t i e s w i l l fairly and
a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the
class.
(emphasis added^
T h e b u r d e n was on p l a i n t i f f s
required prerequisites
tai ntai necl

'^c r---r ~^*~

-auou^-

..

to d e m o n s t r a t e

;-d that

that: these

a class a c t i o n

..uantv rood S a l e s , Inc., b 1.1

could

F . 2d

'
T h e s e 10 a d d i t i o n a l p r e f e r r e d s h a r e h o l d e r s were those
w h o s o u g h t to i n t e r v e n e in this lawsuit a f t e r d e f e n d a n t s filed
t h e i r s e c o n d and final m o t i o n for summary j u d g m e n t .
When Judge
S a w a y a d e n i e d t h e i r m o t i o n to i n t e r v e n e , they filed a s e p a r a t e
c o m p l a i n t , B r o a d b e n t , et a l . v. E q u i t a b l e Life &. C a s u a l t y , et
al.,
Civil N o . 920902649CV.
That lawsuit has b e e n stayed upor '
s t i p u l a t i o n , p e n d i n g the o u t c o m e of this a p p e a l .
s:\pbb\2691

230 (10th Cir. 1975); Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar
Company, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974); 3B Moore's Federal
Practice, % 23.02-2 (2nd Ed.).
While the complaint and plaintiff's Motion to Maintain
a Class Action mimicked Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, they failed to demonstrate that the prerequisites to
the maintenance of a class action had been met.

See Richardson

v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); Rossin v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973).
a*

The Numerosity and Typicality Requirements
Were Not Met.

Each requirement of Rule 23 (a) must be given an
independent meaning.

Redhouse v. Quality Food Sales, Inc., 511

F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).

The numerosity requirement, Rule

23(a)(1), requires a demonstration that the proposed class is so
numerous that joinder is impracticable.

Taylor v. Safeway

Stores, Incorporated, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).

The

Broadbent lawsuit filed by the other preferred shareholders
demonstrates that joinder was practical and therefore the
numerosity requirement was not met.
The typicality requirement, Rule 23(a)(3), requires
that plaintiffs demonstrate that there are other members of the
proposed class who have the same or similar grievances as
plaintiffs.

Certainly plaintiffs' claim cannot be typical of the

claims of an entire class if the other members of the proposed
class do not feel aggrieved.

q-\nbb\2691

Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate
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that the other members of the class they wanted to represent had
the same grievances of which plaintiffs complained.

Plainti ffs

needed to demonstrate in some manner that other preferred
shareholders had a compLaini.

White v. Gates Rubber Company. 53

to al.. wt • ne other preferred shareholders and tine l:mirei
interest shown . \ : espcnse demonstrates * ^.H" *-'r<=- -ypzcai'^v
reqi; i

•--*=•

._-

..

_

•-;.,:. j

.-

:.

r - . - - : . -_-

shareholders apparently preferred to retain their sr_ ck
than sell

;a:her

* ~.s oroposed : :: "he Comriaint.
'. - :«•.-•_•_ i : th:ip_v ..-;_,... noi support a contention that

Judge Sawaya misapplied the iaw or tnat ne abused his discretion.
The denial of class ac- i ' y~

• ' : +,: ' * -'

:

• •

:

:

*

- -*''' -Tie i .

JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' LIQUIDATION
CLAIM
Defendants' f irs^ ^^*:-^n ~~y -artial summarv ^ : dement
Ai <E • :|1""" "+ Qir '':?•:::ad t :: di -

v

.

:<.i/'ion r1 ;.

Defendants supported rneir statement of undisputed faots with the
affidavit - : ?

H'ar1 P~ss . President

Itsurance Tnvestment

oral argument, -Judge Sawaya found that a liquidation :f insurance
Ir'^srne^ ""T.r.nr." as conte^r: ried in I L S A5*
u.v.:;.hi-t:.;ri i^u never occu.r^d.
Tne undisputed facts set c r
R. 2 54, incl i id :

s:\pfab\26 91

• i defendants' memorandum,

1.

Insurance Investment Company has never in its

corporate existence dissolved or liquidated its assets, wound
down its affairs, or ceased to exist as a corporate entity.

The

sole business activity conducted by Insurance Investment Company
is the holding of Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company
stock.

This business activity has in no way been altered as a

result of Equitable's purchase of Insurance Investment Company
preferred stock from members of the Ross Family.

R. Earl Ross

Aff. %<h 9/ 10 (R. 264).
2.

Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company has

never in its corporate existence dissolved, liquidated its
assets, wound down its affairs, or ceased to exist as a corporate
entity.

Equitable is in the insurance business which business

activity has not been diminished in any respect as a result of
Equitable's purchase of Insurance Investment Company's preferred
stock from members of the Ross Family.
1.

Ld. UH H ' 12.

No Liquidation of IIC Ever Occurred,

Plaintiffs claimed that a partial liquidation of IIC
occurred which triggered certain rights in their favor pursuant
to IIC's amended Articles of Incorporation, which read:
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution
or winding up of this corporation, the holders of
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to be paid in
full the par value thereof before any amount shall
be paid or any assets distributed to the holders
of Common Stock Class "A", and after the payment
to the holders of Common Stock Class "A" of an
amount equal to the par value of said Common Stock
Class "A" the remaining assets of this corporation
shall be divided and paid to the holders of

«5 \nbb\2691
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P r e f e r r e d Stock a n d t h e h o l d e r s of C o m m o n Stock
C l a s s "A" a c c o r d i n g to the n u m b e r of their
respective shares.
The second issi ie t a ised b y p] a int:if f s ' appeal a d d r e s s e s
this claim...

P l a i n t i f f s n e v e r d i s p u t e d the fact that IIC h a d

n e v e r 1 i q u i d a. t e d..

R a t h. e r, t h e i r c 1 a i m r e 1 i e d o n t h e s i n g ] e

pi; emise 11 ia,t Equitable ' s purchase of the IIC preferred

stock

c o n s t i t u t e d a "partial liquidation.; " although that term, is not
found in the amended A 3 : t: cl es of I n o : rp :)] : at: :)i :i

- \ par tial

Tl le

l i q u i d a t i o n is unique to the tax code ai id is n o t a. liquidation as
c o n t e m p l a t e d in the amended Articles of Incorporation.

J i idge

S a v r a. y a g r a n t e :I t: 1: I s i i: t c t: i o i i f c • i: s u i i 11 i: i a i: } j i i, d g m e n t, e x p 1 a i n i n g t h a t a
l i q u i d a t i o n as contemplated in the Articles of Incorporation had
n e v e r occurred.
Judge Sawaya's decision is supported b y an
o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of decisions in. both federal and state
jurisdiction

. A\\: \

. .. r

."

...

ss :i s to

a s s e m b l e a m ^rx-xij-j t ^ v,oipuidtic:r s assets, settle wi/:; *'e
creditors and debtors
'^
11

•"

;

'

'" '

*:i : apportion *: h- remaining assets
;

""-

J:^:=U

>" . 2d 6 ," :', u "/ -J ; Jt;:

States v

F.^.d

. - -

.-:

.:,-JLKL.
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c

-• - v C t . '"": .

. _.-. aurui^ u- LNitnTiQuib u. „ m p a n y - :..

- ? ": '

reducing assess *"-^ '-J-~
•^ :—

ivietcaif,

; . . ; r4 ^ ; Rothschild International

Corporation v. Liggett Group Inc. , 4 ^ < - ?d -4."
• -

:*'

--:

-J

'• iquiaat: on is the process of

- T-na^ain xiabilit i <-r-^

and di^idiii'i

-• — > •' • U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 7 4 F . S u p p . 10 b 1, 1 u F 5

™Zi~

(E.D. Tenn. 1972) .

To liquidate is to wind up the affairs of a

company by getting in the assets, settling with the debtors and
creditors, and appropriating the amount of profit or loss.

State

ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 281 N.W. 172,
175 (Iowa 1938) .

Furthermore, in order to liquidate a business,

the business must "cease to exist as a corporate entity."
Rothschild International Corporation v. Liggett Group Inc., 463
A.2d 642, 646 (Ct. Ch. Del. 1983).

Liquidating a business means

permanently terminating the affairs of the business.

Ex parte

Amos, 114 So. 760, 765 (Fla. 1927).
"Liquidation" is a term of art that describes a
situation in which the corporation winds up its affairs and
distributes its assets to those entitled to receive them.
Brock's Estate, 218 A.2d 281, 289 (Pa. 1966).

In re

Courts

consistently apply this well-defined meaning of liquidation in
cases where preferred shareholders claim a right to payment under
their respective corporation's Articles of Incorporation.

See

Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7698 (1979).
Equitable's acquisition of the IIC preferred stock was
a mere transfer of stock and clearly does not meet the widelyaccepted definition of "liquidation."
2.

Plaintiff&' Reliance on the Tax Code is Misplaced,

In defining "liquidation," Plaintiffs rely on cases
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code.

In fact, plaintiffs cite

to over half a dozen such opinions primarily for the proposition

-24-

that even if a corporation has not wound up its affairs or
"liquidated"

in t }>- widely-accepted sense, a partial liquidation-

- a s d ^ f i n ^ d in u 1 ^ F r 11 e r n a 1 R e , r e n u e «,.." o <. J e - - c an occur.

After

referring to nine such cases in their trial court memoranda,
plaintiffs surprisingly, but correctly, stated that" t h-> FRS
definition 'it |jdil. jiil liquidation does not apply to the present
case. 7
Until fairly recent 1 y ,, In > * i shareholder couched a
payment he received n ^ m a ;.rpoia:
consequences.

:i :.aa significant * :>;

": " ::e shareholder r^^ei'^-d a dividend from *~he

-1 re.-:--r

-

.-;-.*-

:

:/:ome ar.a

^

shareholder was laxea appropriately according \c :11s individual
r.ax hracke*"
:-]ei!ii

TP

. however

:.

Lrt.i

*" ^

rav^-rr was consi d-~-i- -

;i.ia;_:.

. ^n capita- g a m s La*"-?s

applied ana the shareholder was generally taxed a~ a .':w--> *
C^nqress scecificaxa
__: <-

ie c :- i ' ^ - • -

;, :,

h e r m thai s e e m s u n i q u e i. J t a x joae cai^ctii'ie . n a s m u c h

as liquidation is normally an A \ ,
the r a x ood~ i ^ f

i

• -:c:v::ng a f f a i -

•r-^.y-^.- ^ n

ii* -

a contraction oi _^e cuipoiaLicn's business.

7

.f
.-.r:<er and

Plaintiffs stated:
"Since the instant matter does not
solely concern tax matters, the finder of fact will not be
confined to the corresponding definitions in deciding whether
there has been 'any liquidation' entitling the preferred
shareholders to the same payment p e r share as the common
shareholders. Rather, the more general common definitions will
apply." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, dated August 17, ± Q 9Q, p . 8, R. 2 7 8 .
s:\pbb\2691
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Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 1f 9.52

(1971) .

Case law has developed in the tax

courts as taxpayers/shareholders have litigated whether a partial
liquidation and a contraction in business can occur even if the
corporation remains an ongoing concern.

A partial liquidation as

defined in the tax code has nothing to do with the instant case;
but even if it did, there was never a contraction in IIC's
business.

Instead, the 1987 purchase resulted in IIC owning a

larger portion of Equitable.

Ross. Aff. R. 264 H 9, 10, R. 264.

The use of the term "liquidate" in IIC's amended
Articles of Incorporation necessarily refers to a complete
winding up of IIC's business because it calls for preferred
shareholders to be paid first upon the event of any liquidation,
dissolution, or winding up of the corporation.

The same sentence

then goes on to provide how all of the "remaining assets" are to
be distributed.

This could only be referring to the non-tax type

of liquidation, i.e., a complete liquidation.
Plaintiffs' reliance on the Internal Revenue Code in
this case is simply misplaced.

Judge Sawaya properly found,

based on the undisputed facts, that no liquidation of IIC, as
contemplated in the Articles of Incorporation, had ever occurred.
The Summary Judgment must be affirmed.

Q \nhh\?691
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f

JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING
CLAIMS
!ur m i r d , fourth, and fifth issues raised by

p l a i n t i f f s ' appeal d ^ J w:*r ooints addressed in defendants'
se.:::

..

:. .-

::gment, regarding plaintiffs'

remaining claim fcr breach of fiduciary duties.
summary ^uiicmer/: addressed
dereai p^air.n its' claim.

The motion, for

m m b ^ r nf alternate grounds to
v«:.en he granted the motion, Judge

Sawaya entered a short minute entry that did not suggest the
basis

for'

MI " d^i'iMiMii

i'nr

t \ iai

'niiii.',

i ijjuit::

r. u c o m p l y

with

the last sentence of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, requiring a brief written statement of fhp qr-nnds for
i t , decisn »ii, d» > e s J i< »l

inakt i t he judgment defective, but.,

admittedly, it makes this court's task more difficult.

Allen v.

Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company , H j 9 I-', 2d " ' {J8
(Utah 1992) , O n appeal plaintiffs have elected to raise each
alternative ground upon wn: :h d e f e n d a n t
Wh^n r P V -*

* :

relied ;: *•- ^::

.

me c ion.

u : resume

the decision u ^ oe correct: and must ^ea:on rcr grounds upon which
it m a y be .no:-- :'
Blacksmi ...

x _ r „^

^„^

:

~m *": ng College Irr. Co

. ._

court determine that summary

. u. : ' :e
yjagmeu: wc.- proper, even if for a

reason n ^t assigned bv - b ^ *"v*: a
a f t i. rmed

-c ?a:. Rive: _*

— - '

* ---^ **---: u* -

^ . ^ ~ i n.. J^.«. u„ . •:. OA 1 ^ A s s ^ i a t e s ,

-c

1. 2u ^ 2

(Utah 1938, ; Rice Melbv Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County,
646 P.2d 696, 698 n.3 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) .
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1.

The Fact That Plaintiffs Are Not Equitable
Shareholders Is Fatal to Their Claim.

While plaintiffs continue to tout that their claims
cannot be avoided by corporate artificialities, the facts remain
unchanged that (a) Equitable, not IIC, was involved in purchasing
the Selling Group's stock, and (b) plaintiffs are not Equitable
shareholders.
immaterial.

These facts cannot simply be dismissed as
Plaintiffs, here and before the trial court, cited

Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230 (111. 1988), as primary support
for their contention that as shareholders of a holding company,
they are not barred from suing as individual shareholders for
actions taken by the subsidiary.

Brown v. Tenney addressed

whether Illinois corporate law recognizes a shareholder's right
to bring a double derivative suit.

In a double derivative suit a

shareholder of a holding company seeks to enforce a right
belonging to the subsidiary, and only derivatively to the holding
company.
Brown v. Tenney does not stand for the proposition that
shareholders of a holding company are de facto minority
shareholders of the subsidiary, or that shareholders of the
holding company can bring individual claims against the
subsidiary as indirect minority shareholders.

In fact, Brown v.

Tenney supports Equitable's argument that IIC is the Equitable
stockholder, not plaintiffs; and if there is a stockholder claim
to be asserted against Equitable, it must be made by the actual

<? \ r > b b \ 2 6 9 1
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stockholder, and if IIC refuses, then by IIC's shareholders in a
derivative action.
The

! "iw remains uncontradicted by Brown v. Tenney, or

any ether _:ase ;::~ed cy plaintiffs, that plaintiffs, as
stockholder- m

a noidina — r e a r "

.r , ;,< . . ::• . .

nor entzt^ea t. ' ne r:ah: - .: stockholders in :he

subsidiary

IkB W.

•

- t

Letcher, Cyclopedia of the law of Priva*e

Cc rpcra 111:

,-•- : <;-;'— jcrcora*". -r

existence cecween a .:'^di:i_j jempany ana ;:s subsidiary _s n:t
disturbed simply because th° *"AC rc^poritions are
,3ini share some

-v-

-'d

1 the Sciin^ d Lrectors, otficers, or shareholders.

[A] holding company is generally held not to be
doing or transacting business through its
subsidiary where the separate corporate entities
are maintained.
By the same token, the creation
of a holding company does not affect the separate
and continuing existence of the corporation whose
stock in holds, nor is the situation altered
simply because the stockholders, directors and
other of f ;,""•=> vq of - v— two companies are identical.
hi\ w. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations,
§ 2821

(perm. ed. 1989) .
The Law in Massachusetts That in Closely Held
Corporations the Corporation Must Ratably Purchase
Shares From Minority Shareholders is Not the Law
in Utah, The Purchase of the Selling Group's
Stock Was Based on the Business Judgment of
Equitable's Board and Did Not Give Rise to a Duty
to Purchase Plaintiffs' TIC Preferred Stock.
Plaintiffs cite Donahue v. Redd Electrotype Co, of New

England, Inc., 323 N~E.2d 505
Llicit

Ma."

*-

propos-

i I i closely held corporation purchases shares from its

S:\pbb\26 91

majority shareholders, it owes an equal opportunity to minority
shareholders to ratably sell their shares.8

While this may be

the law in Massachusetts, it is not the law in Utah, Lochhead v.
Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988); Nash v. Craigco, 585
P.2d 775 (Utah 1978); In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir.
1986), and represents a rule of law that has been rather soundly
rejected.

Clacrett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir.

1978); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969).
Equitable's decision to purchase the Selling Group's
stock was based on rational and compelling business
justifications.

Donahue and the other cases cited by plaintiffs

all relate to a preferential liquidation or minority shareholder
"freeze out," where a majority shareholder caused the corporation
to purchase his shares, for no other justification than to favor
that majority shareholder.

In contrast, Equitable's decision to

purchase the Selling Group's IIC common stock was based on
several rational and even compelling business justifications: (a)
to stabilize control of Equitable, (b) to put an end to the
divisiveness among the owners of IIC voting common stock, and (c)
to end all ongoing litigation.

In order to accomplish this

business objective, Equitable was forced to purchase all the
Selling Group's stock, including their IIC preferred stock.

8

The court must remain cognizant of the fact that it was
Equitable that purchased the selling group's stock, not IIC.
Plaintiffs are not Equitable shareholders. To extend plaintiffs'
argument would require any purchaser of stock to buy out all of
the corporation's other shareholders.
-30-

In contrast to Donahue and the other cases cited by
plaintiffs, the more recent case of Delahoussaye v, Newhard, 785
:

W, 2 d

6 ">' < \P]ri A i"i f"

19 9 0 )

i s pe r sua.s i v e ,. The

re

t he dire c tors

ot a close corporation decided to purchase over half of the
corporation's 550 r 000 outstanding shares from two fami ] i es
\ \i*>

represented

budr: d

The corporation purchased the shares

in order to i1i eliminate ongoing dissension on the board; (2)
promote orderly transaction D£ bus„i i i,ess ; and (3 ) B 1 i„„mi ri„at:„e
divided loyalties.

M*

Plaintiffs claimed that the directors

violated a fiduciary duty when they redeemed shares from,
shareho] dei

s wh 3 were a ] s :> : f f i cers and, :3 i r ect< :)i s , bi it

denied

plaintiffs' request to ratably redeem, their shares on comparable
terms.

Jd. at 6 0,9,

shareholder s wei

The court held that the minority

e i i : t: si it it led to ratable redemption where

directors; for business purposes, redeem, some outstanding shares.
Id. at 611.
Courts 'Ai.i^a./ recognize that if a corporation's actions
are motivated by va::i business purposes, the -corporation is
protected LL "

il

board were motivate;

-:..•-

- - ••__..

, .la business judgment that buying out of

the dissident stockholders wa^ necessar; *
exi stfinrp "

s:\pbb\2691

^, , a

v. Mathes, 1 ^ P.^i '":'

Equitable ^
stockholder

maintain ~*~-

Zheiz

decision.

i::]|:ie Eqi i,i tab]

•*-*

."-.

-nti"1^d t^ deal selective.-..-.

-
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WJLLII

. A s measure^ ;v <-he

its

e

standards of the business judgment rule.

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa

Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985).

Under the

business judgment rule there is the presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of Equitable acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984).

Aronson v.

So long as the

Equitable Board's decision can be attributed to any rational
business purpose, the trial court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the board.

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 4 93

A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985).
3.

Plaintiffs Have No Claim for Relief Even if There
Were a Genuine Issue of Fact Surrounding the
Motive for the Purchase of the Selling Group's
Stock,

Plaintiffs had an opportunity to depose Rod and Earl
Ross, Equitable's President and Chief Executive Officer,
respectively.

The Rosses testified about the complicated

distribution of IIC voting common stock between the various
members of their family including family trusts and charitable
foundations.

From these facts, plaintiffs inferred that the true

reason for the Selling Group stock purchase had nothing to do
with the Bennett Leasing takeover; instead, it was a culmination
of Rod and Earl Ross' continuing efforts to gain control of
Equitable.

This, they claim, created an issue of fact and is

really the crux of their argument.
at 9; Id. at 39.

s:\pbb\2691
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See Appellants' Brief, % 23

A s p l a i n t i f f s ' theory g o e s , E q u i t a b l e ' s p u r c h a s e of the
S e l l i n g G r o u p ' s stock w a s supposedly carried out to facilitate
Rod a n d Earl R o s s 1

efforts to gain control of Equitable and. not

to "serve E q u i t a b l e ' s best: interests according to its d i r e c t o r s '
bi is i ness ji idgment

Therefore , Equitabl e shoi ill d a ] s :: 1 lave

p u r c h a s e d plaintiffs'" stock.

The defect: in this theory is that

it is u n d i s p u t e d that the IIC p r e f e r r e d stock w h i c h p l a i n t i f f s
o1; i 1

as A e ] ] e

\IC p r e f e r r e d stock sold b y the Selling

G r o u p , does not affect the control of Equitable in any w a y ,
s h a p e , o r form,.

T h e IIC p r e f e r r e d stock is n^rvvoti i ig stock

::.e c e n t r e . ^:

-^ .n .:s v o t i n g common st ic^

...a A-,.- the

stock that Bennett Leasing nad secretly scuant ::c purchase.
on v -^-;.q

'- i

• -I

• r •• i --- • • "•-

.

:

stock w a s b e c a u s e tne S e n u i g Group .nsisced.

"he
t:-irei

Equicacie nad -*?

interes*" ~r *~'r.^ preferred st^c*, it? acquisition did nc^rvr.T

illogical.
~ ~ :• a un-i i s r ^ - ^ d
GJI: DU.

v

" ; :^ t - - h °

n

.oqouiations witr

%:_;'_-_/^r p o w e r p l a y t . . ^ u n

might wish * . inter rr:m c:tr transaction.
that Equitable
^- JO-

th-

:• :

:. »:e: '

Sealing
; :;

..: is st:L. u n d i s p u t e d

* •ur'-his^ '"h- Selling G r o u p ' s i~ ' •--<=•r-'-^ed.
: •- . the Selling Groi ip over the othei IIC

p r e f e r r e d s h a r e h o l d e r s , or t : freeze cu* tnese p r e f e r r e d
s h a r e h o l d e r s wr ' '^

S:\pbb\2 6 91

•-.-.-

rorporati on.

4.

The Law in Utah is That a Cause of Action For Any
Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Corporate Officers
Belongs to the Corporation and Not to Stockholders
Individually,

Defendants argued to the trial court that even if
plaintiffs could overcome the facts that (a) Equitable, not IIC,
was involved in the Selling Group transaction, and (b) plaintiffs
are not Equitable stockholders, plaintiffs still have no
individual cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

In In

re Black, 787 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that
[u]nder Utah law, a corporate officer owes a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its
shareholders. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels
Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). However,
this duty is owed to the shareholders
collectively, and no fiduciary duty is owed to the
stockholders individually. Id. at 639-40. Thus
Utah follows the general rule that any cause of
action "on account of any breach by [corporate
officers] of their fiduciary duty as directors and
officers . . . belong[s] to the corporation and
not to the stockholders individually." Id. at
640.
(Emphasis added.)
In Delahoussave v. Newhard, supra 785 S.W.2d 609, the
court reached this same conclusion as to duty to all
shareholders.

Although the Delahoussave court held that the

corporation's purchase of its stock was motivated by legitimate
business purposes, the major rationale for dismissing plaintiffs'
claim rested on another legal argument.

The court explained that

plaintiffs' complaint proceeded entirely on a theory that a
breach of fiduciary duty had occurred because the directors
redeemed the shares of other minority shareholders and not
plaintiffs' shares.

Id. at 613.

The court rejected that theory,
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holding that in the absence of statutory support or some special
obligation, plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a cause of
action.
The court stated that plaintiffs' complaint was an
attempt to allege indirect in-jury, ^h^n rH rv^t

in|in • 1-

necessary tor plaint itfs to have an individual cause of action.
Id. at 613.

The court defined direct injury:

[a]ctions based upon torts where the injur y is
done directly to an individual shareholder,
director or officer as such, depriving him, fa
shareholder] of his rights, for instance,
wrongfully expelling him or refusing to allow him
to inspect the corporate books and records, are
actions which may be brought by shareholders as
individuals . , . Ordinarily an action based on
acts relating to the capital stock as an entirety
is a corporate cause of action and cannot be sued
for by a shareholder merely as an i ndi vi dual.
Id, au », i „ iquoting oieseimann v. Stegeman, 4 4 3 S,W.2d 12 7, 131
(Mo. 1969)i
I i ke j i 1 - i i n t :i f f s ' • ::ai ise o f act: :i • :>n i i I Delahoussa ye,
plaintiffs* allegations here failed to state a cause of action.
5.

Punitive Damages Cannot be Awarded When .No General
or Compensatory Damages Are Sought.

1;; "':\e acr' : ""^n bel-w. cLair *~ : f ".- asked
{•>• -- -

re] i ef ba^~
their breach O L n d u c i a r y aucy ciair
claim, plai nr i f f ? ask^d
.-.. . -tbi - - : . . . . .
remedy at i;^ -

p

r:o zr.eii

"

- -vo *'" orms of

.?>.::: \ b )
liquidation

^r mandatory nr'm.crive relief

:•"

' .:e grounds they riad no adequaT.-r

Complaint * r

would have required Equitable *
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\s

p v

-:
: h •"-*

."he relief they sought
' '-

-•'

red

stock and related solely to plaintiffs' liquidation claim.

The

trial court fully disposed of plaintiffs' liquidation claim on
October 24, 1990, when it granted Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

As to their breach of fiduciary duty claim,

plaintiffs directed the claim against officers, directors and
shareholders, namely Rod and Earl Ross, not the corporations.
Plaintiffs asked for punitive damages only on this claim.

Ld. at

12.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) (a) forbids an award of
punitive damages unless general and compensatory damages are
awarded.

The statute states:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or
general damages are awarded and it is established
by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of,
the rights of others. (Emphasis added.)
The case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah

1978) does not support the contention that plaintiffs were
entitled to punitive damages against the Rosses where their
liquidation claim sought equity against Equitable and IIC.
Plaintiff did not alternatively seek damages against the
corporation.

Indeed, had plaintiffs been granted the injunctive

relief they sought there would have been no other measurable

damages.

o .\^KK\?fiqi
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In Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court,
t different members than the Nash court, held .

comprised

unequivocally that punitive damages are not recoverable unless
the plaintiff recovers compensatory damaqes.
In LLLuHi the court stated that , " |w]hile the cases
generally hold that the amount of punitive damages must bear some
reasonable^ relation l"' l l"K:i mKumt
is not necessarily true."

^i .ulual ddindgi-'o awarded,

this

But five years later in Cruz v.

Montova, 660 P.2d 72^, 727 (Utah 1 9 8 ^ , the Court stated more
i !-• r '-

•

.

jury's discretion

.:

.

uujes

i± iert to the

o w e v e : . punitive damages must rear \

reasonable relaticnshic to actual damaa--."
.:•.-* Li'^e::: case, piai::ti:;s stated very clearly
:—± Complaint

that they had no adequate remedy at .a*

% [:

,7 ,r

R, 0 0 2 . While the Nash decision \\\H\ per mi I iin award M1 fnniii i ;»-••
damages when the only other relief sought against the same
defendant is equitable, neither Nash no? the statiute ter,v ;: an
aWd:

.

.-•'--•

-••-••

\\y±,

t.

.

t

:..--.

.,tU-..-:

'V

:H

punitive damages is sought against the other defendants.
Plaintiffs' contention that t.hey sough*:" whatever
-"

••

•

additional

. - L . ;.;..;. u:;ig ...-emaps

compensatory damages from the Rosses,, even though their demand
was only for punitive damages, is merely an afterthc • -

s:\pbb\2691
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contradicts paragraph 57 of their complaint and ignores their
failure to alternatively demand compensatory damages.

D.

JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND TO
ALLOW INTERVENTION OF ADDITIONAL PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS
Plaintiffs filed their motions to allow an amended

complaint and to intervene as a response to defendants' second
and final motion for summary judgment.

In fact, Judge Sawaya did

not rule on plaintiffs' motions until he had granted the motion
for summary judgment that dismissed plaintiffs' remaining claim.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying an amendment
after dismissing all of the existing claims.
A trial court may properly deny a motion to amend if it
determines the proposed amendment is futile.

See Bache Halsey

Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F.Supp. 1042,
1044 (D. Utah 1983) (holding that leave to amend should be denied
when the proposed amendment is frivolous, legally insufficient,
or subject to dismissal); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to amend when
summary judgment motion established proposed amendment was
futile).

See also De Robert v. Gannett Corp., Inc., 551 F.Supp.

973 (D. Hawaii 1982) (holding that leave to amend was properly
denied when proposed amendment would be futile)/ Burt v. Blue

-38-

S h i e l d of Southwest Idaho, 5 91 F.Supp. 75 5 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(stating these p r i n c i p l e s ) .
Tl: ] e p r o p o s e d Amended C o m p i a i nl

w.-i:-; I: ul: i i ^ .--iLICJ iriubj^'.'t.

to d i s m i s s a l b e c a u s e it reiterated the identical claims that had
already b e e n adjudicated

(claims for class action certification,

1 iqu:i :iat: ioi i o f 1 1 C ai id b r e a c h o f f i d u c i a r y d u t y )

,r::.ermore,

the p r o p o s e d amended complaint asserted claims upon w h i c h relief
c o i I ] d no t "

B be en g ran t e J
P l a i n t i f f a ' Claim of A l l e g e d Oppressive Conduct
Failed to State a Claim Upon W h i c h Relief M a y B e
Granted.

1 1 a i i 11 :i £ f s • j: i: :i) p o s e d Ai i i e i i • :i e d C o i: i: tp ] a i i 11: a d d e d a sec o i i d
c a u s e o f a c t i o n that w a s n o t a part: of t h e i r e a r l i e r c o m p l a i n t ,
i n w h i c h t h e y ai leged that IIC must b e ] liquidated pursuant to
U t a h Code Ai n )

§ ] 6 ] 0 92 (a) because of a continuirig p a t t e r n of

conduct that w a s oppressive to IIC minority shareholders.
P l a i n t i f f s alleged that IIC1" s d i J i dei id p o l i cy w a s oppressi ve and
that I I C s o f f i c e r s ' salaries were excessive.

This second ca ;se

of a c t i o n w a s futile, because both claims failed to stac~ a c^^^m
.". ' v wh :i ch i el i ef coi il d be gi ai ited.
si

P l a i n t i f f s ' Stock is 6% N o n - C u m u l a t i v e
Preferred Stock.

Plaintiffs complained that IIC rarely declared -*
d i v i d e n d and that when it did plaintiffs only recei ved >-. paltry
si : share

T h e } a ] s : • : ] a :i i ned tl: lat tl: le p a s t d :i 1! iden is

r e p r e s e n t e d only a small fraction of the corporation's a s s e t s ,
Proposed A m e n d e d complaint f 79-82., R. 5 2 9 . Apparent] y
s:\pbb\2691
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plaintiffs have never fully understood that their stock is 6%
non-cumulative, non-voting, preferred stock with a $1.00 par
value.

By definition, if a dividend is declared by IIC's board

of directors, preferred shareholders are entitled, if the
declared dividend is large enough, to 6% of the $1.00 par value
or $.06 per share, and no more.

After the preferred shareholders

receive their dividend, the common shareholders receive whatever
remains of the declared dividend.

If the declared dividend is

insufficient to pay $.06 per share to the preferred stockholders,
or if there is no dividend declared, the shortfall does not carry
forward to the next declared dividend because the preferred stock
is non-cumulative.

The declaration of dividends, if allowed by

the financial stability of the corporation, is permissive, not
mandatory, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-41 and Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a64D9, and rests within the sound discretion of the board of
directors.

As plaintiffs' "seminal" case, Donahue v. Rodd

Electrotype of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975),
states,
The courts prefer not to intervene . . . with
the sound financial management of the corporation
by its directors, but declare as a general rule
that the declaration of dividends rests within the
sound discretion of the directors . . .
. . . Plaintiffs who seek judicial assistance
against corporate dividend or employment policies
do not prevail.

9

Until recent amendments were made to the Corporations
Code, dividends were based on the unreserved and unrestricted
surplus of the corporation. Id.
cs \nbb\2691
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323 N.E.2d at 513, 514.
b.

A Claim of Excessive Salaries is Deriwi'
and Belongs to the Corporation.

Plaintiff;;'

t HX^essi 1 •' ^ f f v ^ c

I MINI

T

=* 1,-u'it- 3,

Proposed Amended Complaint 1| 83-87, I

' states a derivative

claim belonging to IIC and/or Equitable

Richardson v. Ariz:na

Fuels torp

I l I ' 11 h ^

Bessett, 434 X . r.. 1 1 *. , -

w n. •* I1 I •H'' i , besseLL, et al. v.
Mi.-*. 1/31

plaintiffs '':°rj a*""-^ci::n Lu lmp^r--r
;.. : *

=UT3t.' -

* "'

>

- '

r.ainrutrj ji^^g-.j i..v
year ' Id
a-

-F

IIAS'IV

'

*

1

\ . r ^ v c . , p_j&, ^:::s

- y ' idiculous allegation that .

basea
f .:^C

i_ii-::^. : ,. action.

v: was clear ina:

'^ "

'^_- A as

* wr .awsuics were

-

t..- .:;.-absLarciaced a_egacicns

' :: a 35

pci^v tr a ^it.r/rci n racr: n D ^f ^xcesiiv:

r -

.

.

;.:;v ::c the

corporal:ic:,, ^.tnouor p.amtiffs readily admitted cney have
absolutely no idea what salaries either corporation current 1y
I-

. J 1 M (
. > 1. L Icei s , Because this was at best a derivative claim,

ani at worst was founded on a ridiculous assumption that 35-year
old allegations justi fy corporate 1 i guidat i on , the r] ,-i i m \ M\ :H 1 ] 1 i
1 1 a Jv l)^e 11 siib j ect t. o immedlate dismissal i 1 1 eave had be -:
granted to file the Amended Complaint.

CONCLUSION
For each reason set forth in this brief, Judge Sawaya's
1 \ 1 I i.ngs shrm 11 K» a f M i m^d .
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DATED this

4^
S-7

day of February, 1993

Z^^T

P. Bruce Badger
FABIAN Sc CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellees
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance
Company, Insurance Investment
Company, R. Earl Ross, E. Roderick
Ross
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

^ /

day °f February,

1993, I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to:
Lynn P. Heward
Delwin T. Pond
923 East 5350 South #E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

7<~
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ADDENDUM
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(Q(
Jay B. Bell.. # A 4 " ^
P. Bruce Badcer, * - FABIAN -. ..;.NJi:N41\r
a Proi ; . ::al Corporator
Attorneys tor Equitable Life & Casualty
Insurance Company, " - ranee Investment
Compan/*
7m * ~
- Roderick
Ross
Twelfth r . ^ :
215 South State Street
P. 0. Box 51021C
SaIt Lake C: t \ . J: o^ o4 . -„.
Telephone:
(80i) ^3) 830,
- — I , " ^ ' - "" -'XttJRT

LEGNTINE
._;.
. r: trierrc .
StocK :r
'buraiue ^vestment Company
a Utan Corporation, on behalf of hersand other similarly «Ht-uate^ M l d e r s
such stock,
/
)
Plaint '
)
vs.
)
W R I T A B L E LIFE AND Li.-^*. - , xNSURANCL
a Utah Corporation, INSURANCE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah Corporator
R. EARL ROSS, E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN
ROSS, DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS, CZS\[2
z . -.
and Does 1 through 20 I'JMPANY,

Lie i e r i d a n t s .

Plaintiff's
£. *r i c r.

" a !T -e MI 'I t in
'is

iQncicc^tf

- ^dqe Ja.Tes

Renewed Motinii

t ni i 11

represented

i ni I
uy

hyiui

Oi
I

r,

MaintcnaniK*
I 1 1' 111

ilewiirn

111
i "<|

-.

.avaya

<^» A I l a s s

." • I 111 11, 111
The

II i

defendants

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Insurance Investment
Company, R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross were represented by P.
Bruce Badger, Esq.

The court having considered the memoranda

filed by counsel, having heard argument and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, hereby enters its order consistent with
its minute entry dated June 14, 1990,
It is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Renewed
Motion for Maintenance As A Class Action is denied.
DATED this, ^r

day of June 1990.
BY THE COURT:

James S. Savaya
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

-
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATU OP U'l Art
LEONTINE C. POND and Mnru.ii
HYER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

v.

(I

EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, INSURANCE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS,
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS,
CONNIE ROSS, and Doe* 1 t-h»20,
Defendants.

( ? Ill III Il I"

C i v i l No. 890905755CV
Judge James S. Savaya
)

.ranee
Motion

De#f- • " i' *

h

Investment

Compaiu

fames
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'

'

Afi fill HiF-i

i I'd
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nl

t

1

\

v

ll) p m

He i i m i l i

by Lvnn
J

Ross"

f't j w i '
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.m. n . i p e u t ive

this order consistent

t h e c o u r t ' s m i n u t e e r l ry d a t e d September
ORDERS!

1,

was i e p r e s e n t e d

i i"

Company,

Kaii Ross and R o d e r i c k h

lepiesented
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defendants is dismissed insofar as plaintiffs1 claims and demand
for relief rely upon a liquidation of Insurance Investment
Company.
DATED this

day of October 1990.
BY THE COURT:

_^i

James S./ Savaya
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Lynn~Heward
Attorney for Plaintiffs

j&&

>u*c&^

P. Bruce Badger
Attorney for
Equitable Life and Casi
Insurance Company,
Insurance Investment Company,
R. Earl Ross and Roderick E.
Ross

PBB:101890B

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT TOIIRT
SALT LAKE tI01.JP"! " r ""J! ["A i'K OP UTAH
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G.
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
holders of'Preferred Stock in
Insurance Investment Company,
a Utah Corporation, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly
situated holders nf - -h stock,
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ORDER AND SUMMARY
v.
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
Co rpo ration, INSURANCE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS,
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS
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20,

:v

N-

" 19057 5 5CV
i niw H b a

— a g e James

Defendants,
TV- A\>i
1991

",* .Siifranai" v Judqmenr• dated September 24,

T u HO uy uerendants Equitable tit>

Company { "Equi tabJ e ' l
Earl Ross and F

riviilir

,N,«.,, 1/ ,enil PI- i M I , I "J "J I,

_u.,uaiij ii^unnce

I nsurancp T a w •. i iin n I
d w i

jm*.

il 10 0 p . m .

i" in iiLT; Lici.j^ei" a n d J a y H

i, I 11 i I

tor hearing un Mondd
P l a i n t i f f s , L e o n t i n e Pond a

M e r l e H y e r C o m p a n y w e r e r e p r e s e r t e d t ,»>
E q u i t a b l e , I'TC n: i- i n im.v i i I

m 1

,

••

MI

.uni

H.-dei" ick N C V . WI->I-^ rpf eih-1 I , L ! F a b i a n & C l e n d e n

The court heard argument of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises and having taken the matter under advisement, enters
the following Order and Judgment consistent with its minute entry
dated November 21, 1991.

It is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants Equitable, ICC, R\. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross's Motion for Summary
Judgment dated September 24, 1991 is granted.

All remaining

claims in Leontine Pond's Complaint, and plaintiff, Merle Hyer
Company's Complaint-in-Intervention, addressed to these moving
defendants, which were not previously dismissed pursuant to an
earlier Order of this court, dated October 24, 1990, are now dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this Q\-fr4ay

of December 1991.
BY THE COURT:

James S. 'Safwaya
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the J

day of December 1991, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
mailed, first class, postage prepaid to:
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IN T H E THIRD DISTRICT COURT
HALT L A K E COUNTY, SI ATE OV UTAH
I,BONTINE C. POND and MERLE G.
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
holders of Preferred Stock in
Insurance Investment C o m p a n y ,
a Utah Corporatior;, m behalf of
themselves and otner similarly
situated holders of r,uch s t o c k ,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
INTERVENE

v.
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, INSURANCE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS,
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS
DAVID E . ROSS II, DIANE ROSS
W O R T H E N , BETSY ROSS R A P P S ,
CONNIE ROSS, and Does 1 thrci'ili
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Defendants.
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ORDERED, .ADJUDGED and DECREED that applicants
to intervene

•-

is denied.

DATED this X ^ ddy ui
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_ _ _ 1991.
BY THE COURT:

'Mj aines S. ' Safcaya
District Court J ..idqe

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G.
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
holders of Preferred Stock in
Insurance Investment Company,
a Utah Corporation, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly
situated holders of such stock,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, INSURANCE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS,
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS,
CONNIE ROSS, and Does 1 through
20,

Civil No. 890905755CV

v.

Judge James S. Savaya

Defendants.
Consistent with the court's Minute Entry of January 14,
1992, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that plaintiffs' Motion
to Amend Complaint is denied.
DATED this^\_ day of

1992.
BY THE COURT:

James S.'Savaya
District Court Judge

